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List of  Cases 0 Dispute Settlement: Genera 
Appreciation and the Role of'  India 
On  I  January  1995,  the  Understandilzg  on  Rules  and 
Procedures  Goverrzing the SettEement  of  Disputes  (LISU) 
entered into force.  Until August 2006, the DSU has since 
been applied to 348 compkints - more cases than dispute 
settlemerzt under the GATT 1947 had dealt. with in nearly 
five  decades.  The  system  is  perceived,  both  by 
practibioners and in academic literamre, to work generally 
well.  However,  it  has  also  revealed  some  Jaws. 
Negotiations  to review  and  reform  the  DSU  have  been 
taking  place  since  1997  f "DSU  review"),  however, 
without yieEding  any result so far.  Zn  the meantime,  WTO 
Members and adjudicating bodies managed to develop the 
system  furttzer  throw evolvitzg  gractice.  While  this 
approach may remedy some prcrctical  shortcomings of tlze 
DSU text, the more profound  imbalance betw  een rela~vely 
efficient  judicial  decision-mking  in  the  W  (~s 
incorporated  in  the  DSU)  and  near&  blocked  political 
decision-making  evolves  into  a  serir7ms  challenge  to llze 
sustainabilig of the system.  -  -  -- 
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$dtis nrdiGke  provides  an overview of  the firit eleven years 
uf  LES'U  pmcdice aad fhe current DS U review nego~ations. 
Atz  sutksok  f~ar  fatilere  chaUe~ages  to  the  system  is  also 
given.  itdoreover, veegic secGons  of  the aPticle focus  sn 
the  sole  of  iPZ  WTO dispute  seglement,  her use  of 
Ihe  system  and  her  ylarbkrbkc@alZofi  ila  Ihe  DSU  review 
aego~atk'ons. 
1. Introduction 
Trade  agreements  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity  are  instruments  used  by 
governments to achieve trade liberalisation. The  reciprocal exchange of  market 
access rights which occurs through such agreements amounts to an international 
exchange  of  domestic  political  support  between  governments  that  helps 
policymakers to overcome the protectionist bias of uncoordinated trade policies. 
in order to protect the negotiated balance of rights and obligations from eroding - 
e.g.,  by trade restrictions which one government may introduce in violation of the 
trade agreement in order to enhance its political support from import-competing 
interests - trade  agreements  usually  include  dispute  settlement  mechanisms 
based on diplomatic and/or adiudicative procedures. 
Such  a  dispute  settlement  mechanism  is also  included  in the  multilateral 
trading  system.  Based  on  the  rudimentary  provisions  of  two  articles  in  the 
General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  1947,  i.e.,  Article  XXll  on 
Consultations and Article XXlll on Nullification or Impairment of Benefits, dispute 
seitlement  developed  gradually  through  evolving  practice  and  occasional 
codifications thereof. With the exception of an anti-legalist phase in the  '1960~~ 
the trend went from an initially rather diplomacy-oriented mechanism towards a 
more adjudication-oriented one. 
The  conclusion  af  the  Uruguay  Round  of  Multilclteral  Trade  Negotiations 
brought the establishment of the Wsrld Tmde Organisation (WO)  on  1  January 
1995,.  According to Article 181.3  of the W0 Agreement, dispute settlement is one 
of  the  key functiows  QC  the WO,  The rules of the  mechanism are laid down in WO  Dispute Sewlemenf: General Appreciation and the Role of India  I49 
detail in the Understanding on Rufes and Procedures Governing ithe Settlement of 
Disputes fin short:  Dispute Settlement Understanding;  DSU) in Annex  2 of  the 
WO  Agreement. The DSU has both incorporated the inherited concept of GAIT 
dispute settlement, and it has codified the practices that had evolved previously 
into a  consolidated text.  in addition,  it has brought important innovations (see 
below). 
The mechanism has been used actively by Members in the first ten years of its 
existence. At the same time,  it has been a topic of much academic interest and 
debate. Moreover, Members have been involved in negotiations to  review and 
reform  the  mechanism  since  late  1997,  however,  without  coming  to  an 
agreement so far. 
This  article  gives  an  overview  of  the  WO  dispute  settlement  mechanism 
eleven years after it became operational. Chapter 2 briefly presents the structure 
of  the  mechanism.  Chapter  3  includes  basic  data  on  the  use  of  the  system 
between  1995  and  2005  and  its  perception in academic  literature.  Specific 
paragraphs focus on the experience of lndia in the system. Chapter 4 deals with 
efforts of  Members to further develop the DSU  in the DSU  review negotiations. 
Again,  specific attention is given to the role of India in this exercise. Chapter 5 
concludes and attempts to give an outlook on the challenges that await the DSU 
in the coming years. 
2. The Dispute Settlement Procedure in the DSU' 
In  WO dispute  settlement,  private  economic  actors  such  as  consumers, 
producers,  importers and exporters cannot bring complaints directly. Nor does 
the  WTO  by  itself  initiate legal cases  against its  Members,  even  if their trade 
measures  obviously violate  multilateral trade  law.  In WO  dispute settlement, 
complaints may exclusively  be brought by  (and against) governments. Whether 
or not a government will make use of the system in order to tackle a trade issue 
that is raised by a private economic actor is $herefore  a matter OS  national pdicy, 
law,  and  procedure, Some  eeun!ries  have established nsrms for  this  decision WTO AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
process (such as the United States with "Section 301" or the European Union with 
the  "Trade  Barriers  Regulation").2 In  many  countries,  however,  there  is  no 
pu  blicly-known decision process. 
In short, the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding provides for a procedure 
that starts with mandatory consultations as  a diplomatic element. If the disputing 
governments  cannot agree to  a  settlement during these consultations within  a 
certain period,  or  if the  defending  party does  not respond to the  consultations 
request, the  complainant may request a panel to review the matter. Panels are 
composed ad hoc and they consist of normally three specialists who engage in 
fact-finding and apply the relevant WO  provisions to the dispute at hand. Their 
findings and recommendations are published in a report against which either or 
both parties may appeal. Unless there is an appeal, the reports are adopted in a 
quasi-automatic  adoption  procedure  by  the  Dispute  Settlement  Body  (DSB)3 
where  all WTO Members are represented. "Quasi-automatic"  adoption means 
that the reports are adopted unless the DSB  decides by consensus (i.e.,  including 
the party that has prevailed) not to adopt the report. 
In case  of an appeal,  however, the Appellate Body reviews the issues of law 
and legal interpretations in the  panel report that are subiect to the appeal. The 
Appellate Body is a standing body composed of seven jurists,  three of whom (i.e., 
a division) work on each case. The Appellate Body can uphold, modify or reverse 
the  panel's  findings. After this appellate review, no further recourse is possible. 
The  DSB  shall then adopt the report in the quasi-automatic adoption procedure 
described above. 
If  it has  been found that  a trade  measure is in violation of WTO  law,  the 
defendant shall bring the measure into compliance with the covered agreements 
within  a  reasonable period of time,  normally not exceeding  9 5  months.  If the 
defendant refuses to  comply,  the  complainant may ask the  defendant to enter 
inSo  negotiations on compensation,  or may seek authorisation from the  BSB  4.0 
Suspend Concesions or Other Obligations jS(300) vis-c4-vis the defendant at an 
amount equivalent to  the  injury sufiered,  If the adequacy  of  implementation is 
disputed, the  implementation measures are subject to  further  review under the WO  Dispute Seftlemenf: General Appreciation and the Role of India  1  5 1 
DSU.  The suspension of concessions or other obligations, if authorised, normally 
takes the form of punitive tariffs on a defined value of the complainant's imports 
from  the  defendant.  The  structure  of  the  dispute  settlement  mechanism  (key 
elements only) is summarised in Graph 1. 
Graph 1: Simplified Ovenriew of the Dispute Sealerrpent 
Procedure under the DSU 
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The  DSU as  of today represents a codified procedure that combines elements 
of  both  political  negotiation and adiudication.  In  the  current  mechanism,  the 
politicat,  negotiation-oriented elements include, inter alia,  mandatory confidential 
eonsdtations, tactical elements during the  panel stage (establishment of panels 
only at second meeting where the  panel request appears on the  DSB  agenda, 
possibility to suspend the panel procedures upon complainant3 request, interim 
review), and the subordination of the entire procedure to a "political"  body, as 
the competence to adopt panel and Appellate Body reporfs rests with the Dispute 
SeHIesrrent  Body,  Finally,  the  nature of  the  ultimate countermeasures,  I.ev  the 
Suspension  of  Concessions or  Ohher  Obligations  (SC00)  in  the case of  nsn- 
Bmplemen~aiion  of  recommendations,  is  negotiation-orienled  and exciusively VJTO AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
based  on the  political concept of  reciprocity, as  it can  hardly  be  regarded as 
supportive of the security and predictability of a rule-oriented multilateral trading 
system.  The  Special  and  Differential  treatment  (S&D) of  developing  countries 
under the DSU is also a political feature. 
Rule-oriented elements  include,  inter  alia,  the  conformity  and  notification 
requirements with regard to mutually agreed solutions; the right to a panel (more 
generally:  the  removal  of  btocking  possibilities in the  process);  the  appellate 
review stage;  and the  prohibition of  unauthorised,  unilateral  retaliatory action. 
These  elements  seek  to  secure  the  conformity  of  trade  policy  measures  and 
dispute outcomes with the relevant provisions of W6 law. Other features of the 
system such as third party rights also support rule-orientation. 
Given the stage-specific approach to WTO dispute settlement (which provides 
for gradual escalation) and the fact that trade violations do not trigger automatic 
prosecution, we  may furthermore establish the hypothesis that only a fraction of 
all protectionist measures will ever  be tackled under the WTO dispute settlement 
system. We could use the picture of an iceberg: Trade measures in areas that are 
not governed by strict WTO disciplines or that do not seem  politically opportune 
to tackle,  may indeed never  be  raised before the  WTO visibly.  Discussions on 
such measures -  if they take place at all - may be confined to informal settings 
of bilateral meetings or fora below the multilateral level, e.g.,  bilateral economic 
commissions,  mixed  committees  of  preferential  trade  agreements  (or  their 
subcommittees)  and  so  forth.  From  the  perspective  of  the  WO, all  these 
protectionist measures remain "under the water". 
Of  those  cases  that  are  raised  officially  through  the  notification  of 
consultations to the WTO, a considerable proportion is settled during the  rather 
informal consuftation stage,  meaning that the actual outcome of the discussions 
remains often unknown or unclear ("foggy area"). Therefore, those cases actually 
leading to panel ar Appellate Body reports with clear findings of violations may 
iherefore be considered to represent just the tip of the iceberg (see Graph 2). WTO Dispute Settlement: General Appreciafion and the Role of India  153 
3.  Experiences with the VJTO  Dispute Settlement System 
3.1 General Use of the Procedure 
Between  1 January  1995 and 31 August 2006, 348 consultation requests were 
notified to the WT0.4 Compared to the less than 300 cases submitted to GATT 
dispute settlement in 47 years,  this  number already shows that the new system 
has been quite popular among Members so far. However, these numbers should 
not be over-interpreted: The old GATT had less Members, and it covered fewer 
agreements and sectors of economic activiv than the WO. 
Graph 3 shows the intensity in the use of the dispute sel-tiement mechanism in 
its first eleven years,  i.e.,  until 31 December 2005. The number of complaints 
increased  shorply  in the  first  three years  after  the  mechanim had come  into 
force,  and it peaked in 1997 with  50 new consultation  requests  in one single 
year.  Thereafter,  the  number  of  consultation  requests  dropped  .to  an  annual 
average of 30 complaints in the period from 2000 to 2003, and  further to only 
1%  new  complaints  in  2005, the  lowest  number since  inception  of'  +he new 
system, Figures for the firs$ eight months of 2006 indicate a slight increase. WTO AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The  evolution  of  the  number  of panel reports  circulated  displays  a  similar 
petkern, yet with a certain time lag and a peak in "h006.  Overall, the number of 
panel repork is much lower than the number of consultation requests. This shows 
that  mufually  agreed  solutions  can  be  found  in  a  considerable  number  of 
disputes prior to the circulation of the panel report (consultation or panel stage). 
Moreaver, in some cases, several separate consultation requests are dealt with by 
one  single  panel  (e.g.,  in cases  with  multiple  complainants),  which  equally 
contributes to the difference in numbers. The number of Appellate  Body reports 
peaked in i  999, While  every  panel report circulated  in  1996  and  1997  had 
been subject to an appeal, this ratio dropped to an average of around tvvo  thirds 
for  panel reports circulated after 2000. Overall,  there  have been relatively few 
complaints  under  Article  21.5  DSU  regarding  alleged  non-compliance  of 
defendants  with  panel  rulings  (so-called compliance  reviews). The  fairly  small 
number is in stark contrast to the public perception of these "trade wars" as  they 
concern "high profile1' cases,  including EC -  Bananas,'  EC -  Hormones16  and US - 
foreign Sales C~r~orations.~ 
Graph 3: Use of the WTO  Dispute Settlement System (1995-2005) 
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Notes:  i,)  Numbers  refer  to  standard  DSki  complaints.  Hi.)  Some  of  the  panel 
reports circulated in 2005  inay still becolne the subject of an appeal later on. The 
low  ratio  of  pane8  reports  appealed  in  2005 si~r~gild  therefibre  be  ia~tcrpreted 
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In  terms  of  usage  by  country,  the  United  States  and  the  European 
Communities  (EC) have been the  DSU's  most frequent  users  by far:  Together, 
they account for nearly half of the cases brought before the WO  (see Graph 4). 
Among developing countries,  Brazil and lndia are the most important users  of 
the system.  Developing countries' participation in dispute settlement proceedings 
is  generally  increasing,  but  still  on  a  relatively  modest  level,  given  the  high 
number of developing countries in the WO.  The  near absence of LDCs in dispute 
settlement activities is another salient feature: The first LDC to lodge a complaint 
was  Bangladesh.  In early 2004,  the  country asked for consultations with  lndia 
regarding Indian anti-dumping measures against battery imports from Bangladesh.' 
/  Graph 4: Main Users of the WO  Dispute Settlement System (1995-2005)  1 
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Graph by  the author; based  on data from worldtradelaw.net (downloaded on 28 
Februarqy 2086) 
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Regarding the subject  matter,  by far  most disputes concern trade in goods, 
with the GATT  being the agreement whose  provisions are most often invoked in 
disputes.  This  dominance sf  goods  trade in NTO  dispute seNJement  becomes 
even more appclreni when the c0mpil.sini.s relating to the special agreements in 
the  goads sector  (in  particular those  dealing  with trade  renaedies  such  as the 
Agreement  on  Subsidies  and Counfst-vailiag  Measures  and the Agreement W 
Antidurnping) are taken into account (see Graph 51, 156  WO  AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
By  comparison, +he "new issues" - i.e.,  trade in services (GATS) and Trade- 
Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) - have not yet been frequent subjects 
of WO  disputes.  Nevertheless, it should be  noted that  one  particularly  "high 
profile" case -  a dispute between the US  and the EC  on the one hand, and India 
on the  other,  regarding  patent  protection of  pharmaceutical  and agricultural 
chemical  products - ranges among  these   dispute^.^  Similarly,  there  have  not 
been frequent disputes under the GATS. Some of these disputes,  however,  have 
considerable political  and economic  importance,  i.e.,  a  US  complaint against 
Mexican measures affecting telecommunications10  and a complaint by the small 
Caribbean  islands  of  Antigua  and  Barbuda  against  US  measures  affecting 
gambling services.l l 
Graph 5: Agreernet~ts  whose Provisions were 
Subject to Litigation (1  995-2005) 
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Graph by  the author; based on data from worldtradetaw.net (downloaded on 28 
February 2006) 
Notes: GATT  = General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; SCM  = Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countenrailing Measures; AD = Agreement on Implementation of 
Article  VI  of  the  GATT  5994 (Anti-Dumping); TBT  = Agreement  on  Technical 
Barriers  to  Trade;  SPS  =  Agreement  on  the  Application  of  Sanitary  and 
Pbytosanitargr  Measures;  TRIPS  - Agreement  on  Trade-Related  Aspects  of 
%ntellecteea%  Property Rights;  TRBMS  = Agreement  on Trade-Related  Investment 
Measures;  AT$:  =  Agreement  on  Textiles  and  Clotlsing;  CATS  -.  General 
Agreement on Trade in Semices; GPA = Agreement on Government Procurement. WTO Dispute Settlement: General Appreciation and the Rofe of India  157 
3.2 India's Use of the Dispute Settlement Procedure 
As  has  been noted above,  lndia  is among the  most active  developing country 
users of the WTO dispute settlement system.  In chronological terms,  the  pattern 
displayed by India's activities in the system  broadly follows the general pattern: 
Dispute activity was  particu[arly strong in the first years after the new mechanism 
entered into force and then slowed somewhat (see Graph 6). Considered over a 
longer period of time,  cases  brought by  lndia (16) and cases  brought against 
lndia (l  7) are largely in balance. In certain years,  however,  there was  a strong 
imbalance: For instance#  after being a net complainant in 1995 and 1996, lndia 
faced seven challenges to  her trade policy in 1997 alone, without lndia herself 
bringing one single case to Geneva in that year, Most of these cases, which were 
brought by a variety of Members, concerned India's  quantitative restrictions on 
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Cases agaimi 1ndia were  brought by  a  variev of W8 Members, Disputes 
are fairly frequent betvdaen the European Communities and India, whereby lndia 
is more often on the bench than $he  EC. With the United Shies as well,  a  fairly WTQ AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
intense dispute activity has  developed.  However, in the case  of the US,  India is 
more  oPten  a complainant  than  a  defendant.  Isolated  disputes  have  been 
litigated with a number of other MTO Members (see Graph 7). 
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1  Graph  by  the author; based  on  data from worldtradelaw.net (downloaded on  28  1  February 2006) 
Dispi~te  activity involving India has focussecl on trade in goods. As  far as  the 
GATT  is concerned,  India  has  been  both  a  complainant  and  a  respondent. 
Cor?cerning anti-dumping,  she  has  Far  more  ohen  challenged  foreign  anfi- 
dumping  measures  than  vice  versa.  Regarding  Licensing  and  Agrick~Jturta, a 
different  picture  emerges:  India  has  been  more  often  a  defendant  than  a 
complainant. Alihough  the  statistical  data  is too  scarce  to  allow for  sweeping 
generalisations, it points fa a raiiker  restrictite cagricuitural frade policy and to the 
widespread use of licences in India, with adverse repercussions on the free flow 
of trade and,  hence, on the cor3formiiy of  1;ldian trade policrec  with  rnulti/ater&al 
iri?de rules.'" WO  Dispuk Sefllemenf: General Appreciafion and the Role of dnrdia  159 
Other agreements have played a  minor role in India's dispute activities.  As 
one would expect in light of the structure of the Indian economy and her trade 
policies,  she  has  pursued  offensive  trade  interests  under  the  Agreement  on 
Textiles and Clothing, whereas she was  a defendan4 under the TRIPS  and TRIMS 
Agreements.  Graph  8  gives  an  overview  of  the  main  agreements  whose 
provisions were subject to litigation in disputes involving India. 
I  Graph 8: Agreements whose Provisions were Subject to Litigation in  / 
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As  Graph  8  shows,  India  is  particularly active  as  a  complainant  against 
restrictions in the textiles sector. A  minor portion of  Indian complaints concerns 
primary  products  (agriculture  and  shrimp  fishing),  steel  products,  and 
pharmaceutical products (see Table 1). As  a respondent, she was  called upon to 
defend her  policy measures  in a variety  of  sectors  including  pharmaceuticals, 
agricultural  and  chemical  products,  textiles,  automotive  products  and  other. 
Quantitative restrictions and anti-dumping measures were among the most often 
challenged Indian trade policy measures (see Table 2). 
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I Source: WO  Hontepage: Cl~ronological  lists ofdisprrtes cases (http://www.wto.orgJ  1 
I  Table 2: W '0  Disputes with India as Respondent (1995-2005)  I 
Agreements  DS  Conlplainant  l  No.  I 
Patent Protection for 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Matter 
hemical Products 
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Quantitative Restrictions on  Agriculture, GATT; 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and  Licensing 
Industrial Products 
91  Australia  Quantitative Restrictions on  Agriculture, GATT; 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and  Licensing 
Industrial Products 
Quantitative Restrictions on  Agriculture, GATT; 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and  Licensing 
industrial Products WO  AND DISPUTE RESObUTlON 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products 
Quantitative Restrictions on  Agriculture, GATT; 
Imports of Agricultural, Textile and  Licensing, SPS 
Industrial Products 
120  EC  Measures Affecting Export of  GATT 
Certain Commodities 
Measures Affecting Trade and  GATT, TRIMS 
Investment in the Motor Vehicle 
Sector 
Import Restrictions under the  /  Agriculture, GATT, 
Export and Import Policy 2002-  I licensing, SPS, TBT 
2007 
l 
of Certain Products from the 
European Communities and/or 
Customs Terrikoy of Taiwan, 
Penghaa, Mln~men  and Matsu! 
I 
Measures Affecting Customs Duties  150 
I  Source: SviO Homepage; Chronoiogicai lists ofdisputes cases (http://wu.w.rvto.org)  I  ! 
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3.3  Perception in Scholarly Literature 
The  WTO  dispute  settlement  system  has  attracted  a  remarkable  amount  of 
academic attention. In this literature, the system  received a particularly warm,  if 
not enthusiastic, welcome. 
Specifically, the quasi-automaticity in the establishment of panels as well as  in 
the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports was  among the most-lauded 
elements.  This  quasi-automaticity  removed  blockage  possibilities  for  losing 
defendants  that  had existed  in  dispute  settlement  under  the  old  GATT,  The 
introduction  of  precise time-limits was  equally seen  as  a  highly  positive step. 
From a legal point of view,  the  introduction of an appellate review mechanism 
and the institution of a permanent Appellate Body composed of highly-qualified 
lawyers were  greeted as  particularly important contributions towards  improved 
legal quality of decisions and as  a further step towards the rule of law in trade 
matters.13 More generally, this appellate review system  was  greeted as  a model 
for other areas of international public law. 
HUDEC  (1  999,  pp.  4  and  9)  has  warned,  however,  not  to  overstate  the 
differences  between the  new  DSU  and the  former  procedure under the  GATT, 
With regard to the  removal of blocking possibilities, HUDEC  holds that blockage 
did  not  play  too  prominent  a  role  in GATT  practice  either,  as  there  was  a 
community consensus that every Member should have a right to  have its claims 
heard  by  an  impartial  third-party  decision-maker.  Moreover,  GATT  dispute 
settlement had already become a more iudicial instrument in the late 1970s and 
1980s, where the cornerstones were laid for the later evolution towards the DSU. 
As  HUDEC  (1  999, p. 11) argues with regard to the success of dispute settlement in 
the  1980s,  an international  legal system  does  not  require  rigctrously binding 
procedures to be generally effective but requisite political will can achieve much. 
As  to  this  author,  stringent procedures by themselves  are not likely to  make a 
legal system effective unless they are buttressed by sufficient political support. He 
cautioned,  therefore,  that  even  the  new  system  would  not  lead  to  100% 
compliance.  As  under  the  GAT, countries  would  be unable  or  unwilling  to 
comply in specific cases  under WO  dispute se;ttlemeni rules as well. The system 
would accordingly have to learn to live with legal failure. l!f10  AND DISPUTE RESOLU'TION 
Indeed,  legal  literature began to take these  problems  into account towards 
the end of the  19990s  as  imptemenbticn problems surged in a number of  high 
profile cases;  including, infer aiia, EC-Bananas, EC-Hormones, and US - Foreign 
Sales  Corporafions.  In these cases,  the refusal of defendants to implement DSB 
recommendations triggered the  suspension of  concessions  or other  obligations 
(SCOO) by  the  complainant  government  under authorisation  from the  Dispute 
Settlement Body. More commonly known under martial terms like "retaliation"  or 
"sanctions",  the  SCOO  itself  has  become  the  focus  of  much  fundamental 
criticism.  Major problems,  to  name  only  a  few,  include  its  adverse  economic 
effects,  its inappropriateness from a small or developing country perspective, its 
psychological connotations and its negative impact on the predictability of trade 
conditions which the WTO is normally set "r  preserve. 
Other  problems  identified with  the  new  procedure  include  the  often  poor 
respect of the deadlines laid down in the DSU,  the lack of a remand procedure 
which  would  allow  the  Appellate  Body  to  remand  certain  issues  back  to  the 
panels for further factual clarification, and the problems of developing countries 
wishing  to  participate  more actively  in the  system.  More recently,  some  quite 
strong criticism has been spelt out on the iurisprudence of the Appellate Body in 
trade remedy cases. The gist of this criticism is that the adjudicating bodies are 
exceeding their authority and are legislating instead of adjudicating, that they are 
not showing sufficient deference to Members' trade policy decisions, and that the 
system  is  biased  towards  trade  liberoli~ation.'~  However,  for  the  time  being, 
strong criticism  may be considered a minority view  in literature. And,  as  some 
observers hold,  "it is  not always clear that some of the harshest critics of WO 
jurisprudence, many of whom have advocacy roles related to a variety of special 
interests, have the best interests of the overall WTO system in mind."15 
Yet,  there is a real concern about what some commentators perceive to be an 
imbalance between relatively effective legal decision-making by the adjudicating 
bodies  and ineffective  political  decision-making  by  the  political  bodies  of the 
Unlike the  iengthy search for compromise at the  negotiating table,  the 
quasi-automatic architecture  of the  BSU  allows complainants to exact decisions 
on  politically  highly  sensitive  issues  from  the  dispute  settlement  system,  It  is 
therefore hardly surprising that the  DSU  is the forum of choice for governments 
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associated with such  a trend  is that those  Member governments that see  thsir 
interests insufficiently safeguarded might be driven out of the system. This would 
be  particularly  problematic  if large  Members with  "systemic  weight"  were  to 
retreat from the system. There are two sirands in DSU literature that seek to strike 
a  balance  between  the  relative  success  and  well-functioning  of  the  dispute 
settlement system with its adjudicative bodies on the one hand, and the weakness 
of the consensus-based political decision-making at the WO  on the other. One 
school of thought -  probably the  minority point of view -  seeks to re-strengthen 
political  control  of  WO  dispute  settlement  and  to  weaken  its  adjudication 
~haracter.'~  Other  authors,  however,  oppose  any  effort  to  weaken  the 
adjudicating system and argue in favour of focussing reform efforts on improved 
political decision-making,'* 
4. Efforts to  Review  and Reform the  DSU:  The  Negotiations 
and India's Contribution 
4.1 The DSU Review Negotiations 
The accumulated experience of WO  Members with dispute settlement under the 
DSU  constitutes the foundation of the current negotiations to review and reform 
the  DSU.  This  "DSU  review" started already in 1997. However, it could not be 
concluded so far as  several deadlines lapsed without tangible achievements. The 
last deadline missed so-far had been set for May 2004. As  part of the so-called 
"July  package"  adopted  on  1  August  2004,  the  mandate  to  continue  the 
negotiations has been renewed, however, without a new deadline being set. This 
mandate was subsequently reconfirmed at the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the 
WO  in Hong Kong in December 2005. 
Despite their  lack  of  success,  the  discussions  are  of  interest as  they  track  the 
evolution of country interests and negotiating positions in the dispute settlement 
system. Moreover, they  point to opportunities perceived for improvements to the 
system and to the general degree of satisfaction with the system. The latter is of 
particular  importance  in  a  "member-driven  organization".  Whereas  a  full 
account  of the  negotiating  process  and of  the  many heterogeneous proposals 
submitted by Members wsuld be beyond the scope of this paper,"  a summary of 
tine  stages of the negotiations process and of  the major proposak received shall 
be given. WO  AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
4.1.1 The Initial Stage of DSU Review Negotiations (1  997-1 999)" 
Negotiations in the early stages took place under a 1994 Ministerial Declaration 
and were supposed to conclude by the Third Ministerial Conference,  i.e.,  by the 
Seattle meeting. Several Members participated actively in these largely informal 
negotiations (inter alia the  European Communities,  Canada,  India, Guatemala, 
the United States,  Venezuela,  Hungary, Korea, Argentina,  Japan) as  a range of 
issues was  discussed. The negotiations were mainly characterised by two divides - 
one  ran between  industrialised countries (mainly between the  US  and the  EC) 
whereas the other pitted industrialised against developing countries. 
The  rift between industrialised countries was  mostly due to the efforts of the 
United States to strengthen the enforcement quality of the system.  Being a "net 
complainant"  in these  initial years  of  DSU  practice,  and having won  several 
"high  profile"  cases  (such  as  EC  - Hormones,  €C - Bananas,  Canada - 
Magazines,  or lndia - Patents), the  United States  became increasingly  worried 
that the implementation of the  reports would remain behind their expectations. 
They  therefore  pressed forward with  retaliatory  measures  and threats  thereof, 
whereas the  EC  and Canada tried to delay the implementation of rulings. This 
translated  into  different  proposals  for  the  DSU  review  negotiations  on  the 
so-called sequencing  issue which  arose for the first time in €C - Bananas over 
ambiguities  (or even contradictions,  as  some may argue) in Art.  21.5/22  DSU. 
The  key  question  was  whether  a  "compliance  panel"  must  first  review  the 
implementation measures undertaken by a defendant before a complainant may 
seek  authorisation  to  retaliate  on  grounds  of  the  defendant's  alleged  non- 
compliance.  Whereas  the  US  initially  opposed  any  idea  of  sequencing  and 
favoured  immediate  retaliation,  the  EC  and  many  other  members  argued  in 
favour of the completion of such a compliance panel procedure as a prerequisite 
to seeking an authorisation to retaliate. The EC  underlined its position, inter alia, 
by bringing a  DSU  case  against US  legislation requiring early  retaliation2' and 
against its application22  in €C -  Bananas, as well as  by seeking an authoritative 
interpretation of the DSU in this respect.23  Both attempts ultimately failed. 
Andher dempt  by the US to increase the enforcement power of WO  dispuie 
sei"r1emerat  occurred when  it discussed the  so-called "carousel  retaliation"".  This 
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suspension of concessions, and it surfaced for the first time when the  "Carousel 
Retaliation Act  of  1999"  was  introduced  into  Congress.  Its  purpose  was  to 
increase pressure on the  EC  Commission and European governments  in €C - 
Bananas and €C - Hormones by requiring the government to periodically rotate 
the  list of  products subject to  retaliation in order to  maximise the  effect  of the 
sanctions. The  measure was  signed into law in May 2000,  but has so far never 
been  applied.  Whereas  the  EC  (supported by  most  other  nations) sought  a 
prohibition of carousel retaliation in the  DSU review of  1998/1999, the US  had 
sought a footnote explicitly allowing such retaliation. In a parallel development, 
the  EC  had requested consultations under the  DSU on the carsusel provision in 
summer 2000, however, without proceeding to the panel stagesz4 
Finally, the  US  did not only pursue a "tough stance"  on sequencing and on 
the carousel issue,  but it also sought shorter timelines for certain steps  in WTO 
dispute settlement. 
The  controversy  between  developed  and  developing  countries  was  of  a 
different  nature.  It  mainly  focused  on  the  issue  of  transparency  and  the 
acceptance of  so-called "amicus  curiae briefs",  with the  United States  pressing 
hardest for both. Regarding transparency, the US  wanted to make submissions of 
parties to  panels and the Appellate Body public, and it wanted to  allow public 
observance  of  panel  and  Appellate  Body  meetings.  Developing  countries  in 
particular,  but  also  some  industrialised  countries,  opposed  such  increased 
transparency,  as  they  feared  "trials  by  media"  and  undue  public  pressure.25 
Insisting  on  the  intergovernmental  nature  of  the  WTO,  developing  countries 
equally  rejected efforts  by the  US  and the  EG  to  formalise  the  acceptance of 
amicus curiae,  or "friend of the court",  briefs. Amicus curiae briefs are unsolicited 
reports which a private person or entity submits to an adjudicative body in order 
to support (and possibly influence) its decision-making. These briefs became an 
issue  for  the  first  time  in  1998 when  the  Appellate  Body  decided  in  US  - 
Shrimp/Tvrtle26 that  the  panel  had the  authority to  accept  unsolicited arnr'cus 
curiae briefs. That right was  subsequently confirmed in further disputes, causing 
outrage  among  many  developing  country  Mernbers  who  feared  undue 
interference from NGOs," WO  AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
4.1.2  The "Limbo" in the DSU Review Negotiations (2000-2001)28 
After  the  December  1999 Seattle  Ministerial  Conference  had failed,  the  DSU 
review essentially remained in limbo through  most of 2000 and 2001. Isolated 
efforts of Members to change the DSU failed. 
However,  as  DSU  practice  moved  along,  negotiating  positions  changed 
behind  the  scenes.  New  developments  in  the  case  US  -  Foreign  Sales 
Corporations which the  US  had lost and where implementation measures were 
now disputed, weakened in particular the US  position on issues such as carousel 
or sequencing:  After  it had become increasingly clear that the  US  replacement 
legislation (Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act;  ET11  would not be in compliance 
with  the  DSB  recommendations,  the  US  and the  €C negotiated  in September 
2000 a bilateral procedural agreement on how to proceed in this case in order 
to  bridge  the  gaps  in  the  DSU  on  the  sequencing  issue.  According  to  the 
Agreement,  a sequencing approach was  adopted under which a panel (subject 
to appeal) would review the WO  consistency of the replacement legislation, and 
arbitration on the appropriate level of sanctions would be conducted only if the 
replacement legislation was found WO-inconsistent. The US had now become a 
beneficiary of the sequencing approach (even with the possibility of subsequent 
appeal) which  it had opposed  before.  It is  believed  that,  in exchange  for  the 
agreement,  the  US  had to back down on carousel retaliation although no such 
deal had been explicitly made part of the procedural agreement. The retaliatory 
measures requested by the  EC  were several times  higher than  US  retaliation in 
EC - Bananas and EC - Hormones combined.29  The  arbitrators later confirmed 
that the  suspension of concessions in the  form of  100% ad valorem  duties  on 
imports worth 4.043 bn USD constituted "appropriate countermeasures". 
US - Foreign Safes Corporations was  not the only case that had a weakening 
impact on the negotiating stance of the US: With more and more trade remedy 
cases -  t.raditionally the Achilles heel of U%  trade policy -  being brought against 
the U%  and the latter losing most of thse, the US  stance changed from offensive 
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As  attempts to move the DSU review forward in 2000 and 2001 proved to be 
unsuccessful, the DSU  review only returned to the fore at the Fourth Ministerial 
Conference  in  Doha  in  November  2001.  The  Daha  Ministerial  Declaration 
committed Members to  negotiate on improvenlents to  and clarifications of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding. 
4.1.3  The Doha-Mandated DSU Review Negotiations (2002-2004 
According to the  Doha mandate on the  DSU  Review,  an agreement was  to  be 
reached no later than May 2003. Formal and informal discussions were  held 
under the auspices  of the Special Negotiating Session  of the  Dispute SetEIement 
Body,  chaired  by  PETER BAL);s  of  Hungary. Work  progressed from  a  general 
exchange  of  views  to  a  discussion  of  conceptual  proposals  put  forward  by 
Members. In total, 42 specific proposals had been submitted by the deadline of 
the negotiations at the end of May 2003. The  negotiations were comprehensive: 
Not  only  did  they  cover  virtually  all  provisions  of  the  DSU,31 but  they  also 
involved  a  large  number  of  Members,  including,  inter  aJia,  all  the  "Quad" 
Members (with submissions being made by the EC,  the US,  Canada and Japan) 
as  well  as  developing countries of all sizes  and stages  of  development. As  the 
papers  were  usually  circulated  as  formal  proposals  (which  means  that  the 
documents were released publiciy), this stage of the negotiations is relatively weli- 
documented. 
Compared to the  pre-Seattle stage of  DSU  review negotiations, negotiating 
positions  were,  however,  less  clear-cut  now.  The  most  remarkable  change 
occurred in the  position of the  United States,  which  reflected its  new defensive 
stance in dispute settlement practice. In December 2002 the US  submiHed, jointly 
with  Chile,  a proposal to  strengthen flexibiiiv  and  member  control  in dispute 
~ettlement.~'  The  proposal  would  alfow  the  deletion  of  portions  of  panel  or 
Appellate  Body  reports by agreement of the  parties to a dispute,  and an only' 
partial adoption of such reports. Moreover, it calls for "some form of additional 
guidance" to WO  adjudicative bodies. The gist of the submission  is to transfer 
influence from the  adiudicative bodies to  the  parties to disputes. The  proposal 
was  greeted predominantly with scepticism, wiih Members arguing that deleting 
parts of  panei or Appellate  Body  reports would weaken the WO  cradJudieating 
bodies. Moreover, the move was seen as  a  contradisBian to  earlier proposals on WO  AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
improving transparency as  parties would be able to "bury"  more controversial or 
grot~ndbrecking  decisions  by  the  adjudicating  bodies  before  the  rulings  were 
made public. The  proposal was  understood as  attending to the complaints from 
Congress that the WTO adjudicating bodies were legislating. 
A  large n~~rnber  of other  proposals,  only  some  of which  can be presented 
here,  were  submitted.  The  EC  reiterated  calls  for  the  establishment  of  a 
permanent  panel  body  instead  of  the  current  system  where  panellists  are 
appointed ad hoc, discharging their tasks on a part-time basis and in addition to 
their ordinary duties."  Opponents of the proposal argue that a permanent panel 
body  could  be  more  "ideologicaltf  and  might  engage  in  lawmaking.  They 
therefore feel  more comfortable with the current system which draws heavily on 
government  officials  who  are  familiar  with  the  constraints  faced  by 
governments.34 
Developing  countries  submitted  a  variety  of  proposals  with  quite  different 
orientations.  For instance,  some countries sought to strengthen enforcement by 
introducing collective ret~liation.~~  It is meant to address the problems caused by 
the lack of retaliatory power of many small developing economies, such as those 
experienced  by  Ecuador in €C - Bananas. With collective  retaliation,  all WTO 
Members would be authorised (or even obliged under the concept of collective 
responsibility)  to  suspend  concessions  vis-6-vis  a  non-complying  Member. 
Proposals  for  the  retroactive  calculation  of  the  level  of  nullification  and 
ivairment and for  making the  SCOO a  negotiable  instrument  (Me~icoj,~~  for 
introducing a fast-track panel procedure (Bra~il),~'  and for calculating increased 
levels of  nuilification or impairment (Ecuador)"  have a similar thrust. At the same 
time,  the  African  Group  questioned  the  automaticity  of  the  current  dispute 
seHlement process and sought the  re-introduction of more political elements.39 
China even proposed the intr~duction  of a quantitative limitation on the number 
of complaints per year that countries could bring against a particular developing 
country."0 
By  contrast  fa  these  con"rroversi&rl proposals,  a  large  number  of  less 
csntroversicri  issues were integrated into a compromise text that was  elaborated 
by  Ambassador  PS~~ER  BAL~S  of  Hungary.  This  so-colled  BAGS text4'  cgntains 
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requirements  for  mutually  agreed  solutions,  a  procedure  to  overcome  the 
U  sequencing issue"  in Art.  21 5/22 DSU,  the  introduction of an interim  review 
into the appellate review stage,  and a remand procedure in which an issue may 
be remanded to the original panel in case the Appellate Body is not able to fully 
address an issue due to  a lack of factual information in the panel report. The 
compromise text  would  also  have  introduced numerous amendments  in other 
areas, including, inter alia, housekeeping proposals, enhanced third party rights, 
enhanced compensation, and several  provisions on the special and differential 
treatment of developing countries. 
Despite  the  existence  of  a  compromise  proposal,  the  deadline  for  the 
completion  of  talks  that  had  been  set  for  the  end  of  May  2003  was  finally 
missed. While many smaller trading  nations would have favoured coming to  a 
conclusion on a limited package of  issues,  both the  EC  and the  US  preferred 
negotiations to continue, and to address those (of their) concerns that had been 
left out in the BA~S  text. 
Members  subsequently  agreed  to  extend  the  deadline  for  the  review  by 
another  year  until  the  end  of  May  2004.  However,  the  failure  of  the  Fifth 
Ministerial Conference held in Canclin, Mexico, in mid-September 2003 caused 
a further setback to  overall negotiations under the  Doha  mandate which  also 
affected DSU review negotiations. Only a few additional proposals were brought 
into the negotiations between May 2003 and May 2004,  including an informal 
paper by Mexico with an analysis of major issues in dispute settlement practice,42 
an informal proposal by Malaysia on provisional measures,43  a communication 
from  Indonesia  and  Thailand  with  questions  relating  to  the  composition  of 
panels,44  and a communication from Thailand on the workload of the Appellate 
Body.45 
The Chairman then established a brief report on his own responsibility to the 
Trade  Negotiations  Committee,  He  suggested  continuing  the  negotiations, 
however, without any new target date.46  I, the subsequent decision adopted by 
the  General Council on  1 August  2004 on the  Doha Work  Programme - the 
so-called  ""duly  Package"  - the  General  Council  took  note  of  the  above- 
mentioned repor$ and the  continuation  QC  negsfiations according to  the  Dsha 
Mandate along the lines set out in the r"hoErmtrn% report was decide$.d' WO  AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
4.1.4  Negotiations after July 2004 
Negotiations  continued  through  the  rest  of  2004.  Discussions  focussed  on 
stocktaking  and  on  a  proposal  by  Argentina,  Brazil,  Canada,  India,  New 
Zealand  and Norway,48 dealing with  issues  such  as  sequencing,  remand  and 
post-retaliation,  However,  "not  much was  achieved",  as  the  Chairman noted in 
his opening remarks at the first negotiating session on 18  January 2005.J9 
Unlike the  discussions  held in 2002 and 2003,  the  negotiations took  place 
again  in  a  more  informal  mode.  A  key  characteristic  of  these  informal 
discussions  is a lack of public documentation: Neither the  proposals (circulated 
as  so-called  "Jobs")  are  made  public,  nor  are  the  informal  portions  of  the 
discussions  documented  in  the  protocols  (TN/DS/M/  document  series). 
Presumably,  this  informal mode is meant to  shelter the  negotiators from public 
pressure and to facilitate a more open exploration of possible solutions without 
committing  the  Members  to  positions  discussed  during  such  talks.  The 
preparation of  the  negotiating  sessions  was  also intensified: Preparatory work 
was  mostly done informally in groups of countries with similar interests such  as 
the  "Mexican Group" (also called "off-campus group";  an informal group open 
to participation from all delegations), the G-6 (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, India, 
New Zealand and Norway; initially including also Mexico as  G-7), and the "like- 
minded" group (a group of developing countries, including India). 
Informal proposals were submitted by the  "G-7" (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
India,  Mexico,  New  Zealand  and  Norway;  third  party  rights)50,  the  European 
Communities  and  Japan  (on  sequencing"  and  on  post-retaliation"),  the 
European  Communities  (panel  composition)53 Korea  (focussing  on  remand 
authority  for  the  Appellate  Body),54 and  Australia  (time- saving^).'^  Formal 
proposals  at  that  stage  were  submitted  by  the  United  States  (focussing  on 
transparency5%nd  on  flexibility",  including  on  additional  guidance  to  WTO 
adjudicative bodiesia).  Finally, a number of  proposals focussing on special and 
differential  treatment  of  developing  countries  were  referred  to  the  Special 
(Negotiating) Session of the Dispute Settlement Body by the Special Session of the 
Committee on Trade and Bevel~pment.~' 
In the  Ministerial  Declaration which  resulted From  the  Sixth WO  Ministeriae 
Conference held in  Wong  Kong  in December 20635, Members took ""note of the WO  Dispute SeHlement: General Appreciation and the Role of lndia  173 
progress  made  in the  Dispute  Settlement  Understanding  negotiations,. ." and 
directed "the Special Session to continue to work towards a rapid conclusion of 
the negotiations".60 
In 2006, work on the DSU review has continued on a largely informal basis.6' 
in Spring, informal proposals were circulated by the G-7 (revision of a proposal 
on third party rights),62  Canada (revised version of a (3-7 proposal on third party 
rights),63  Hong Kong (focussing on third party rights),64  Japan and the EC  (joint 
proposal,  focussing  on  "post-retaliation",  i.e.,  the  upward  or  downward 
adjustment  of  retaliation  along  with  changes  in  the  level  of  nullification  or 
impairment),6i  as  well as  by the  G-6. Formal proposals on flexibilityd6  and on 
transparency6' were circulated by the US 
In  Summer  2006,  informal  proposals  were  circulated  by  Japan68 and 
Swit~erland,~~  each of which focussed on third party rights, as  well as  a proposal 
by  Cuba,  Malaysia  and  India,  containing  revisions  to  a  previous  formal 
prop~sal.'~ 
Despite the suspension sine die of the  Doha talks which occurred in late July 
2006, the DSU review talks appear to continue." 
4.2 India's Contribution to the DSU Review Discussions 
4.2.1  India's Participation in the Initial Stage of DSU Review Negotiations 
(1  997-  1  999) 
From early on,  lndia has actively participated in the DSU review discussions. She 
submitted  her  first  discussion  paper  in  the  DSU  review  period  1998/7 999, 
dealing with  all stages  and several  horizontal issues  of  the  dispute settlement 
process: 
Regarding  consultations,  lndia  proposed  to  set  a  time-frame  for  the 
notification of mutually-agreed sol ~tions.'~ 
With regard to the panel stage,  India voiced her concerns about due process 
and  equal  opportunities  to  examine  and  rebut  arguments  and  comment  on 
documentarp. evidence. She  therefore sought to  give the  con.lp1ainan.t and the 
defendant three to four weeks  each,  in sequential manner, for  making +he first 1 74  WTO AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
and  the  second  submissions to  the  panel.'3  In  order  to  have  clear  terms  of 
references for  panels  at an early  stage,  lndia suggested that  the  complaining 
party make all its claims in the first written submission, and that no claim should 
be  entertained  that  had not been  presented  in the  first  written  submi~sion.'~ 
Drawing on her experience in the India-Patents Case, where first the US and later 
the EC  requested a panel on basically the same issue,  lndia suggested that rules 
for multiple complainants under Art. 9 and 10 of the DSU need to be adapted: 
She  held that "an  unmitigated right to bring successive complaints  by different 
parties based on the same facts  and legal claims would entail serious risks for 
the  multilateral  trade  order,  besides  imposing  an  (sic!)  unnecessary  resource 
costs of re-litigation of the same m~tter."'~  Moreover, lndia sought to ensure that 
matters  already  undergoing  the  panel  process  may  only  be  referred  to  the 
original panel before the first written submissions have been made by the parties 
to the original di~pute.'~  Finally, lndia proposed to amend Art.  16.4 DSU on the 
adoption of panel  reports  so  as  to  provide  60 days  after  circulation  of  panel 
reports to Members before they are considered in the DSB." 
On appellate review, lndia proposed to increase the period of time between 
the circulation of Appellate  Body reports to Members and their consideration in 
the DSB to 30  days."  lndia also called for improved transparency with regard to 
the  constitution  of Appellate  Body  divisions.79  lndia further  proposed to  extend 
the time-frame for appellate review from 60 to 90 days.80 
Implementation: With regard to implementation,  lndia called for a solution to 
the  problem of an uneven distribution of retaliatory power between developing 
countries on one hand and developed countries on the other. Specifically, lndia 
suggested limiting the right of developed countrids to retaliate against developing 
countries to countermeasures  under the  same agreements  in which a violation 
may  have  occurred,  while  allowing  developing  countries  to  get  relief through 
joint  retaliation  by  the  entire  membership  of  the  WO  against  the  wrongful 
defendant." 
The  Indian proposal also dealt extensively with the  provision on special and 
differentiai  treatment  of  developing  lndia  deplores  the  general 
character atad lack of specificiiy in many S&D  3s  there was no way 
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developing  countries  in  practice,  lndia  suggested  replacement  of  the  word 
"should"  by  "shall"  in such  provisions,  as  well  as  specific  guidelines to ensure 
rigorous  implementati~n.'~  lndia  further  proposed  to  differentiate  between 
developing  and  developed  countries  when  it comes  to  implementation:  For 
disputes involving developed and developing countries, lndia wishes to increase 
the maximum time period for implementation from 15 months to 30 months in 
the  case  of  developing  country   defendant^.'^  Moreover,  lndia sought  to  give 
developing countries additional time to  implement the commitment "(i)f,  due to 
circumstances  beyond the control of  a developing country and in spite of such 
country's  best endeavour, the developing country  is  unable to complete action 
within  the  implementation period  By  contrast,  lndia  proposed a  30 day 
time-frame for  the  compliance  panel  procedures  in cases  against  developed 
countries "without any further procedural requirement.""  Regarding time-frames, 
lndia also  called for  longer time-frames for  developing country defendants to 
prepare their submissions,  rebuttals etc.88 
In her  paper,  lndia  also  expressed  her  frustration  over  "certain  developed 
countries"  that use  dispute settlement proceedings "to  prove their aggression to 
domestic constituencies." According to India, "(p)rocedures must be developed to 
make  sure  that  the  interests  of  developing  countries  are  protected  and that 
developed countries do not use dispute settlement proceedings as  instruments for 
coercion of the  less  privileged Member countries."  This  would translate  into a 
concrete suggestion that developed country Members abstain from invoking the 
DSU  if the  trade  effect  of  a  developing  country  measure  on the  developed 
country  is  only  marginal,  i.e.,  below a  certain  de-minimis  level. Alternatively, 
panels should first look into this aspect and dismiss the case if it is found that the 
trade effect does not exceed this de-minimis limit. 
In her proposal, lndia also highlights the problem of the enormous legal cost 
associated with participation in WO  dispute settlement. in order to alleviate the 
burden on developing countries,  lndia suggests that some kind of levy  may be 
imposed  on  a  country  using the  dispute  settlement  mechanism.  The  amount 
collected  would,  along  with  supplementay  WO  funds,  be  used  to  assist 
developing countries. Moreover, developed countries should bear "re legal costs WO  AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
incurred  by  developing  countries  in  cases  challenging  developed  country 
measures  that  are  later  found  to  be  illegal.  Finally,  lndia  calls  for  increased 
capacity-building efforts to the benefit of developing c~untries.~' 
lndia  remarks  in her  proposal  that  dispute  settlement with  regard to  anti- 
dumping  cases  had a  different  standard of  review  than  dispute settlement in 
other  areas.  Given  the  special  conditions  and  circumstances  of  developing 
countries,  lndia  sought  to  remove this  anomaly  by  either  subjecting  the  Anti- 
Dumping  Agreement  to  the  same  standard  of  review  as  other  covered 
agreements or, alternatively, to apply the standard of review currently used in the 
Anti-Dumping Agreement to the 
4.2.2  India's Role in the "Limbo"  in the DSU Review Negotiations (2000- 
2001) 
After  it became clear in mid-1999 that the  DSU  review could not be concluded 
within a deadline that had been set to July  1999, lndia and some other countries 
opposed any continuation of  the  review after the  1999 summer  break."  lndia 
was  not  particularly  supportive  of  continuing  the  DSU  review  at  the  Seattle 
Ministerial either, taking an intermediate position along with Indonesia, between 
countries that expressed outright opposition against a continuation of talks (such 
as  Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines and Egypt) and countries that favoured the 
continuation thereof  (the US  in particular, but also many other WTO Members 
such as  the  EC,  Japan, Canada, Brazil, Australia and others). As  noted above in 
Section 4.1 -2,  the DSU review remained essentially in limbo in 2000-2001, with 
no major contribution by lndia being noted. 
4.2.3  India's  Contribution  to  The  Doha-Mandated  DSU  Review 
Negotiations (2002-2004) 
In the  2002-2003 negotiations under the  Doha mandate, lndia took once more 
an  active  role.  She  engaged  early  on  in the  discussions,  submitting  a  large 
number of questions on a paper which had been submitted by the  EU  (the first 
paper at all under the Doha-mandated negotiations). 
Later  on,  lndia brought in proposals jointly with other developing countries. 
Some of 'rhe proposals are familiar from the paper submi~ed  by lndia previously 
(see above Section 4.2.1). These  include improved notification requirements for WTO Dispute SeMlement: General  Appreciation and the Role of India  177 
mutually  agreed solutions,  the  strengthening  of  developing  countries when  it 
comes to making use of  countermeasures, and the problem of  litigation costs. 
The contents of  all  the formal  proposals  (CO-)sponsored by  lndia  during  the 
2002-2003 negotiations are  summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3: Synopsis of the Proposals (co-)sponsored  by 
lndia in the 2002-2003 Negotiations 
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more  attractive),  on  transparency,  and  on  amicus  curiae 
submissions (answers in TNIDSN7).  I 
India 
The  EU's  answers  to  India's  questions,  as  contained  in 
TNDSnN15.  I 
39  questions on the EC  Proposal as contained  in  TN/DS/W/I,I 
covering  the  proposals  for  a  permanent  panel  body,  on 
implementation  issues  (in  particular  making  compensation 
Proposal, consisting of (I) An introduction, and calling for (11)  ~n( 
obligation to notify within 60 days the terms of settlement of  l  mutually  agreed  solutions;  (Ill)  Clarification  that  the  term, 
IUseek"  (right  to  seek  information)  shall  be  limited  to1 
information sought actively by the panels and the AB,  and that1 
unsolicited information (amicus curiae briefs) shall not be taken' 
into  consideration;  (IV)  New  terms  of  appointment  for  AB 
members, consisting of non-renewable six-year terms; (V) Prompt 
distribution  to disputing  parties  of  inputs  provided  by  the 
Secretariat;  @'I)  Establishment  of guidelines on the nature of 
the notice of appeal in  order to make sure such notices are 
sufficiently  clear  (Working  Procedures for Appellate  Review, 
WT/AB/WP/4);  (Vll)  Preservation  and expansion  of third  party 
/rights  during the appeal. 
Conceptual and textual proposal calling for (I) The freedom of 
developing  countries  to suspend  concessions  vis-8-vis  non- 
complying  industrial  countries  in  sectors  of  their  choice; 
(11)  Awarding  litigation  costs  in  cases  involving  developing! 
countries and industrial countries to  the industrial country if itj 
does not prevail  in  the dispute;  (111)  Further S&D  provisions,' 
/regarding  consultations, time-frames, and implementation.  I 
l 
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India,  i~extual  proposal, strengthening the notification requirement of1 
Cuba,  mutually  acceptable  solutions  (Art. 3.6), factually  prohibiting! 
Dominican  /panels to accept unsollicited information (footnote to Art.  13),1 
Republic,  appointing Appellate  Body  members  on  a  non-renewable six/ 
E~Y  pt,  lyear term (An. 17.2),  giving third parties a right to be heard by 
Honduras,  the  Appellate  Body  (Art.  17.4);  establishing  minimum 
Jamaica,  !requirements for  notices  of  appeal  (footnote to Art.  17.6);i 
Malaysia  denying  the  Appellate  Body  the  right  to  seek  or  accept  l iinformation from  anyone  other  than  parties  or third  parties 
j(footnote  to  Art.  17.6); expanding  freedom  for  developing 
/countries regarding sectors subject to retaliation (Art. 22.3bis); 
/awarding litigation costs to developing countries of  500'000 
USD  or  actual  expenses,  whichever  is  higher  (Art.  3bis); 
strengthening the S&D provisions in Art. 4.10, Art,  2 2.10, Art. 
121.2. 
In addition to the afore-mentioned formal proposals, lndia submitted a non- 
paper jointly with Argentina,  Brazil, Canada, New Zealand and Norway in mid- 
May 2004,  shortly before the  lapse of the  May 2004 deadline. This  document 
contained textual proposals on a selection of  issues,  i.e.,  sequencing,  remand, 
and procedures for the  removal of the  authorisation to suspend concessions or 
other obligations.92 
4.2.4 India's Contribution to Negotiations after July 2004 
In the  months after the  lapse of the May 2004 deadline,  the  afore-mentioned 
informal paper submitted  by  lndia  and some  co-sponsors93  remained on  the 
agenda  of  the  DSB  special  negotiating  ses~ion.'~  in  January  2005,  lndia 
submitted - jointly  with Argentina,  Brazil,  Canada,  Mexico,  New Zealand  and 
Norway - another  paper  on the  DSU  review with  a textual  proposal  on  third 
party  rights.95 A  revised  version  of  the  same  paper  was  presented in Spring 
2006.~' 
In  Summer  2006,  lndia  submitted - jointly  with  Cuba  and  Malaysia - an 
informal paper containing revisions to a previously submitted text,97  foeussing on 
developing  country  issues  such  os  special  and  dieeren"ra1  treatment  'of 
developing  countries,  freedsm  of  cross-retaliation for  developing  countries,  a 
narrow interpretation of the  right to  "'seeki9  information as  contained in Art.  13 
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In addition to advancing proposals of her own and jointly  with others,  lndia 
increasingly  participated in coordination  efforts  between the  different  informal 
groups.99 
4.2.5  Analysis: lndia in  the DSU Review 
lndia participated actively in most stages of the DSU review, with the exception of 
the  2000-2001 period when negotiations were  in a general  limbo. In the  BSlJ 
review  negotiations,  lndia focussed  clearly on  developing  country  interests,  in 
particular  with  a  view  to  strengthening  special  and  differential  treatment  of 
developing  countries.  Some  of  the  proposals  lndia  brought  were  clearly 
motivated by her own experience with the mechanism. 
In the  (mostly informal) negotiations that  have taken  place since  2005,  lndia 
actively  participated  in several  informal  groups,  also  trying  to  build  bridges 
between  proposals that  were  elaborated inside these  different  groups.  In this 
context as  well, a major focus of India's efforts lay in the special and differential 
treatment of developing countries. Not surprisingly,  the major allies of  lndia in 
these  negotiations were other developing countries such as  China,  Nigeria and 
Malaysia. 
4.3 The Difficulties of Concluding the DSU Review 
The difficulties faced by negotiators so far in their attempts to reach a successful 
conclusion of the DSU  review negotiations may be explained with a number of 
reasons:  Firstly,  the  consensus  requirement'00 for  any  change to  the  DSU  sets 
high hurdles, particularly as  the WO  counts  149 heterogeneous Members with 
equally  heterogeneous interests. These  problems are further exacerbated in the 
case of the DSU review where negotiators are intending to reap an early harvest 
outside the larger context of the Doha negotiations and thus within a narrow field 
of negotiations, offering less space for compromise solution through the linkage 
of different issues and interests. 
Secondly, key decisions of the adjudicative bodies and Members' experience 
with the system have created cosltroversial views on specific aspects of the system 
that  have  become  increasingly  difs"icult  to  bridge  (e.g.,  on  issues  such  as 
transparency,  amicus curiae briefs) carousel retaliaiisn or collective retaliation - iN7'8 AND DtSPUTE RESOLUTION 
to mention but a few). Thirdly, and of fundamental importance, there appears to 
be a more profound ccrratrsversy regarding the overctll direction the BSU should 
pursue,  namely  whether  it  should  continue  ifs  route  towards  more  rule- 
orientation and adjudication, or whether it should return to a  more negotiatory 
and  diplomatic  - i.e.,  power-oriented - approach.'0'  Proposals  with  both 
orientations have been submitted, as the non-exhaustive list of examples in Table 4 
show. 
/  Table 4: Power-Orientation versus Rule-Orientation in the Doha Round  l 
I  DSU Negotiations  I 
I  requirements for mutually  I  consi~ltations/parie!  requests;  I 
acceptable solutions and written 
reports on the outcome of 
consultations; 
5  Connpliance reviews of ~nutually 
agreed solutions; 
Calls for separate opinions by 
individual panellists/Appellate 
Body Members; 
e  Flexibility during appellate review: 
interim review and the suspension 
1 . Reduced time frames;  !  of the appellate procedures;  I 
c  Ci-eation of a professional 
Permanent Panel Body  (PPB); 
Terrns of appointment of the 
Appellate Body; 
Regulating sequencing and 
implementation; 
a  Prohibition sf carousel retaliation;  /  a  Strengthening ellforcement and 
the cost of non-compliance; 
s  Strengthening third party rights; 
Deletion of findings from reports; 
6  Partial adoption procedures; 
Additional measures of special and 
differential treatment of 
developing cot~ntries; 
Extension of time-frames by 
agreement of the parties; 
ObIiging adjudicating bodies to 
submit certain issues to the 
General Council for iriterpretation. 
Increasing external transparency. 
l 
For more details, see ZI,WICIER&I~~NI\I  (20061,  pp. 204-2 14. 
Fourthly,  some  problems  of  the  DSU  review  may  be  explained  with  the 
diSeiculties  of  negotiating  reforms  to  a  system  that  is  constantly  in  use: 
Negotiating pasifions are subject Do  permanent change as  Members conainususly 
gather  new experience due to new cases  and new reports. Moreover,  on-going 
negotiations on material WTO  rules may also have a  bearing on the stance of WTO Dispute SeMierneni: Genera/ Appreciafisn and the Rsk of India  8 81 
Members  towards  the  dispute  se~lernent  sy?;tem  (e,g.,  the  negoiications  on 
"Rvles",  including on anti-dumping). Such  problems can be paitly remedied by 
the inclusion of generous periods of transition for any change to the BSU. 
Finally, despite the criticism that Is occasionally voiced,  there seems  to be a 
general sense of satisfaction with the system. As  the CONSULTAT~VE  BOARD  (2004, 
p.  56) holds with regard to the lack of success of the DSU review to date, "... an 
important underlying  concern  is,  or  should  be,  to  not  Ao any  harm'  to  the 
existing system since it has so many valuable attributes." 
4.4 The "DSU  Review in Practice" 
As  negotiations on the  DSU  Review are stalled,  practical  solutions have been 
found  to  some  of  the  problems  in what  could  be  called  a  "DSU  reform  in 
practice". It includes practical actions both by Members and by the adjudicating 
bodies to further develop the system  and to come to terms with the problems in 
its application, as the following examples show. 
Firstly,  the  sequencing  problem  has  been  overcome  by  the  conclusion  of 
bilateral  agreements  between the  Members  during  the  implementation  stage. 
These  agreements allow Members to .overcome the gaps and contradictions in 
the DSU text in a practical way. Whereas, there has not yet been a consensus to 
adapt  the  DSU  text  to  this  evolving  practice,  Members  have  adapted  to  the 
practice  of  bilateral  agreements  and  do  no  longer  appear  to  consider  the 
sequencing issue as a pressing concern. 
Secondly, a partial solution could be found to the differences of opinion with 
regard to external transparency: In two recent cases,'02 the panels opened to the 
public their proceedings with the  main parties to the dispute,  as  the  latter had 
jointly requested. At the same time, the proceedings with third parties remained 
closed, as not all third parties had agreed to such an opening of the process. 
Thirdly, with regard to amicus curiae briefs, the Appellate Body has de facfo 
developed a very  pragmatic  approach,  despite  initially strong  opposition  from 
mostly dE3'veloping countries. On the  one  hand, the Appellate  Body  displays  cx 
general openness towards the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs. On  the other 
hand,  iB does  not appear  to  accord decisive weight  io these  submissions in  its WO  AND DISPUTE RESOLUTlON 
decisions - at  least  not explicitly.  This  approach  gives  adjudicating  bodies  a 
maximum of flexibility while it respects the concerns of Members who are against 
such briefs. 
Fourthly, on a related matter, the Appellate Body has found a response to the 
concerns of many Members who held that the acceptance of amicus curiae briefs 
gave  NGOs  an edge over Members,  as  the  latter had to cope with  restrictive 
requirements  on  third  country  participation.  It  relaxed  these  requirements  by 
adopting  new  working  procedures  in late  2002  which  give  third  parties  the 
possibility  of  attending  oral  hearings  even  if  they  had  not  made  a  written 
submission  prior to the  hearing,  as  the  old rule had required.'03 Similarly,  the 
Appellate  Body only recently adopted  new working  procedures requiring  more 
precision  in notices of  appeal.  It thus  catered for  a  long standing concern  of 
some Members who had called for increased precision of notices of appeal but 
were unable to reach such a modification through the DSU review negotiations.'04 
As  a final example, the establishment of an Advisory Centre on World Trade 
Law  (ACWL) has  remedied  some  of  the  resource  constraints  that  developing 
countries  face  in  the, more  sophisticated  legal  settings  of  the  new  dispute 
settlement system. This international organisation, which is independent from the 
WO, provides  legal  training,  support and advice  on WTO  Law  and  dispute 
settlement procedures to developing countries, in particular LDCs. ACWL services 
are available against payment of modest fees  for legal services varying with the 
share  of world trade  and GNP  per capita of  user  governments.lo5  The  Centre 
thus  serves  to a certain degree as  a substitute for other institutions such as,  for 
instance,  a  special fund  for  developing countries - a  proposal that  has  been 
brought into the DSU review negotiations by developing countries. 
As  these examples show, Members and adjudicating bodies manage to adapt 
the  dispute settlement system  to  changing circumstances without changing  one 
single provision of the BSU.  Dispute settlement pracfice has thus  brought some 
amount of DSU reform, without facing the problems of political renegotiations of 
the DSU text In  other terms, the system seems  to build once more on its historic 
strength, which is to  evolve with  C!  certain degree of  flexibility and in a pragmatic 
spirit. We should not be surprised ifi  as in the past, these  elements of  evolving 
practice were to be codified into a new or modified text a"s  later date, WTO Dispute Settlement: General Appreciation and the 6?oIe  of India  1 83 
Conclusions 
The  first  eleven  years  of  dispute  settlement  practice  under  the  DSU  have 
confirmed the  usefulness  of  the  system:  Except  for  a  recent slowdown  (which 
cannot be property interpreted yet), the mechanism has been used actively, and 
the perception by both practitioners and academic observers has generally been 
positive. 
Nevertheless,  the  intense  use  of  the  mechanism  has  also  revealed certain 
problems  in its  practical  application.  Guided  by  their  own  experiences  and 
interests,  Members  have  sought  to  improve  the  mechanism  through  several 
rounds of  DSU  review negotiations since  late  1997. So  far,  all these  attempts 
have been unsuccessful. While negotiations are currently continuing, there is no 
clear deadline and, subsequently, there is a presumption that the impetus for the 
conclusion of the negotiations may not be sufficient to lead to a conclusion in the 
near future..  In the meantime, Members and adiudicating bodies have managed 
to resolve some of the practical issues through a further development of dispute 
settlement practice without amending the DSU text. 
As  far as  lndia is concerned, she has made active use of the system.  Most of 
her litigation took place with major trade partners such as the United States and 
the  European Union. The  sectoral pattern of India's  dispute activity follows her 
trade structure and her trade policy profile: As  a complainant,  she focussed her 
efforts  on  challenging  foreign  trade  restrictions  in the  textile  sector  and  on 
foreign  anti-dumping practices. As  a defendant,  lndia  had to  face  complaints 
against her quantitative restrictions, her  patent policies,  and more recently,  her 
anti-dumping practices.  In tune  with  her  active  use  of  the  system,  lndia  also 
engaged  actively  from  early  on  in the  DSU  review  discussions.  As  could  be 
expected,  India's  negotiating  positions  mainly  ,reflect  her  interests  as  a 
developing country, 
Regarding  the  general  outlook  for  the  DSU,  the  maior  challenge  for  the 
system  is not so  much whether the  multitude of technical questions in the  DSU 
review negotiations can be resolved through an agreement but, rather, how well 
suited the  DSU  is to  overcome the  more fundamental  concern - notably that 
there  is  an kinsustainable  imbalance  between  political  and  iudicial  decision- 
making in the WO.  This holds in particular after the suspension sine die of the {VTO ,AND  DISPUTE RESOLCTHON 
Dokltn  RoIJ;~:,~ 3f inuiiilatercl trade negotiations: In  tile  current coniexi of blocked 
psliiicai  negotiations,  pressures  !Q  resolve poiiiiculiy delicate  issues through use 
of the dispute sevkerrten-i-  mechar2ism might increase even further. 
None  of  the  ;WO  generic  options  that  are  being  discussed  to  remedy the 
situation --  weaken'ng adjudication or strengthening  political decision-making - 
lioids great prorrlise if considered in isolation. Weakening adjudication is not an 
anractive option as  t%\ervmbers would have to forego the achievements which the 
new DSU  has  brought For  a  rules-based international trading system.  It would 
also  be at odds with  globcliisution  and its increasing  reliance on internaiional 
transactions in economic life. Aikrnatively, improving political decision-making is 
an exfrernely difiicuit task  and could resuli in  imporkarat bAembers being driven 
out of the system,  if the sacred consensus principle were to be replaced by sorne 
form of majority voting.  Sovereignty concerns similar io  those that are currently 
voiced  against  allegedly  overreaching  dispute  settlement  would  ultimately  be 
raised against undesired outcomes of voting procedures as they would eventually 
force results upon countries which the latter cannot or do not want to accept. 
For  the  time  being,  onty  incremental  steps  by  a  variety  of  actors  therefore 
seem to be feasible and desirable t~ remedy khe  situation: 
*  All  Members  should  assume  .their  systemic  responsibili~  by  exercising 
restraint in bringing pofitically diFFicult eases to adjudication. 
(P  Adiudicating  bodies  should  continue  their  current  approach  to  dispute 
settlement,  based  on  iudiciat  restraint  and the avoidance  of  "sweeping 
slaterrrents". 
*  Selective  multilateral  political  elements  could  be  built  into  the  dispute 
senlement  procedure without  alkring the  basic  architecture  of the  DSU 
(e.g., by irilowing the  DSB  to  decide by  consensus  not to adopt specific 
findings or the basic rationare behind a finding in a report.) 
o  dternbers should explore alkernative poiitical decision-making mech~lrntsms 
rnore  actively,  indeed, the  WO  Cammuniv has  become aware  of  the 
prob1ei-n  as  the  report  t3y  the  ""Consultative  Group"  croiind  PETER 
SUTE~EW~\NC)  to  the  Director General showed. Tkie  reportlbsas a clear focus 
213 ii?sti!u:ior?~l  Issues! including tail decision-making."" Whereas  such  a  gradual  and  eclectic  appraack~  may not  satisfy  the  more 
ambitious observers  who  VJC?U!CI  favour  clear  reforms  in either  direction - i.e., 
towards more adjudication and rule-orientation or  back to po~er-orieniaiion  and 
diplomacy -  this ecieeiicisi-i  appears at !east as a feasible option. And,  if judged 
in the  light of  past experience viiil;  the gradual evoiutiorl  of  the system, it also 
appears to be the most promising approach: The current DSU is the fruit oi  five 
decades of gradual develi>pmeni, which has  no+  been free of setbacks. There is 
no reason to assume why this gradualism should not be adequate for the future 
as  well.  if Members and adiudicating  bodies continue is assume their  systemic 
responsibility, the DSU should continue to remain an aMractive forum for dispute 
se.l?fement. 
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